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Abstract
This paper introduces staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining into a New
Keynesian business cycle model. Our key result is that the model is able to gener-
ate persistent responses in output, inflation, and total labor input to both neutral
technology and monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, we compare the model’s dy-
namic behavior when calibrated to the US and to an European economy. We find
that the degree of price rigidity explains most of the differences in response to a
monetary policy shock. When the economy is hit by a neutral technology shock,
both price and wage rigidities turn out to be important.
JEL Codes: E24, E31, E32, J64
Keywords: Business Cycles, Labor Market Search, Wage Bargaining, Inflation
∗Without implication, we would like to thank István Kónya, Keith Kuester, as well as seminar par-
ticipants at the European Central Bank, the University of Basel, and the joint ECB/CEPR workshop
“Recent Trends in European Employment” for extensive comments and suggestions. Matthias Hertweck
is indebted to Morten Ravn and Salvador Ortigueira for their help and supervision. We are grateful
to the European Central Bank for its financial and organizational support. The second author further
acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (Project No. 118306). The
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. They do not necessarily coincide with those of
the European Central Bank.
†Contact Address: Monetary Policy Strategy Division, European Central Bank, Kaiserstraße 29, 60311
Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Email: agostino.consolo@ecb.int
‡Contact Address: Universität Basel, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Abteilung Wirtschafts-
theorie, Peter-Merian-Weg 6, Postfach, 4002 Basel, Switzerland.
Email: matthias.hertweck@unibas.ch, Homepage: http://www.hertweck.org/
1 Introduction
This paper introduces staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining into a New Keynesian
business cycle model. Our key result is that a reasonably calibrated version of the model
is able to generate persistent responses in output, inﬂation, and total labor input to both
neutral technology and monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, we compare the model’s
dynamic behavior when calibrated to the US and to a European economy. We ﬁnd that
the degree of price rigidity explains most of the diﬀerences in response to a monetary
policy shock. Diﬀerences in the degree of wage rigidity, instead, alter the dynamics of the
model economy only by little. When the economy is hit by a neutral technology shock,
both price and wage rigidities turn out to be important. Apart from that, our results
indicate that matching frictions matter primarily for the dynamics of the labor market.
We introduce frictional labor markets into a New Keynesian business cycle model akin
to Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets & Wouters (2003). Households’ preferences are rep-
resented by an additive utility function over consumption, working time, and real money
holdings. The composite consumption good consists of a CES aggregate of diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods. These goods are produced by monopolistically competitive interme-
diate good ﬁrms, facing Calvo (1983) type restrictions in price setting on the product
market. Factor markets for capital and labor services, instead, are assumed to be per-
fectly competitive. Households accumulate physical capital and rent capital services at
a variable utilization rate to the intermediate good ﬁrms. Labor services are provided
by hiring ﬁrms searching for workers on frictional labor markets (Christoﬀel & Kuester
2008). Upon matching, ﬁrm-worker pairs ﬁrst bargain over the real wage rate which is
subject to staggered wage contracts. In the second step, hiring ﬁrms may choose the
number of hours per worker unilaterally. In this setting, which is referred to as “right-to-
manage” wage bargaining (Trigari 2006), the real wage rate is allocative for the number
of hours per worker. Consequently, any rigidity in the real wage rate is transmitted via
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve into persistent movements of inﬂation. This feature of
right-to-manage wage bargaining is referred to as the “wage channel”.
We then examine the eﬀects of two structural shocks. The ﬁrst shock represents a
sudden increase in the short term nominal interest rate. Using diﬀerent identiﬁcation
strategies and data sets, Sims (1992), Leeper et al. (1996), and Christiano et al. (1999,
2005), among others, demonstrate that such a shock leads to distinct U-shaped responses
in both output and inﬂation. Moreover, Ravn & Simonelli (2008) show that also the
dynamic time path of total labor input follows a U-shaped pattern in the aftermath of a
monetary policy shock.
Second, we examine the impact of a neutral technology shock. Evidence on the eﬀects
of technology shocks is rather controversial. As shown by Galí (1999), a positive technol-
ogy shock generates a persistent rise in output and a persistent decline in the inﬂation
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rate. In addition to that, he ﬁnds a negative correlation between technology and total
labor input. The latter observation is in stark contrast to the predictions of the baseline
RBC model and, thus, has sparked an intense and still ongoing debate in the literature.
While Francis & Ramey (2005) provide evidence in favor of his result, Christiano et al.
(2003, 2004) and Uhlig (2004) question its robustness.1 The study by Ravn & Simonelli
(2008) estimates a SVAR model of the US labor market which includes 4 diﬀerent shocks:
A neutral technology shock, an investment speciﬁc technology shock, a monetary policy
shock, and a government spending shock. They argue that the large set of identiﬁed
shocks minimizes the problem of mis-speciﬁcation and, therefore, yields more robust re-
sults. Their ﬁndings conﬁrm the conventional wisdom that a neutral technology shock
leads to a positive and hump-shaped response in output and a negative and U-shaped
response in inﬂation. Furthermore, they provide robust evidence that (i) output and
total labor input are positively correlated at the business cycle frequencies in response
to a neutral technology shock and that (ii) the impact response of the employment level
is positive. The impact response of total labor input, however, depends on the question
whether hours per worker are level or diﬀerence stationary.2
When we calibrate the model to the US economy, we observe that it is able to gen-
erate persistent output responses to monetary policy shocks. This seems to be the main
contribution of our paper. New Keynesian models with Nash bargaining (e.g. Walsh
2005), instead, are not able to replicate this pattern once capital accumulation is intro-
duced (Heer & Maussner 2010). This eﬀect is due to the alternative bargaining approach.
Right-to-manage wage bargaining establishes a direct link between the real wage rate
and real marginal costs. Hence, any rigidity in the average real wage rate dampens the
response in real marginal costs. This so-called “wage channel” has two important impli-
cations. First, the reduced elasticity of real marginal costs is transmitted via the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve into persistent movements of inﬂation. Second, we note that
the sluggish response in real marginal costs dampens additionally the response of the real
interest rate. In the case of variable capital utilization, this leads to a hump-shaped de-
cline in the input of capital services. Consequently, given that matching frictions induce
a sluggish response in total labor input, we note that the response of aggregate output
reaches its minimum not impact, but just in the second period after an innovation in
monetary policy.
In response to a neutral technology shock, our model is able to replicate a hump-
shaped response in output and a U-shaped response in inﬂation. Turning to the labor
market, we observe that unemployment exhibits a negative impact response and then
1As pointed out by Peersman & Straub (2009) and Heer & Maussner (2010), the impact of technology
on total labor input depends crucially on the question whether hours per worker are level or difference
stationary.
2Their results are broadly consistent with the estimates of Braun et al. (2009), who use an alternative
identification strategy.
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continues to decrease for about 6 quarters. Hours per worker, instead, fall on impact, but
then rise for about 2 years before eventually falling. Hence, consistent with the ﬁndings
of Ravn & Simonelli (2008), we observe a positive correlation between output and total
labor input at the business cycle frequencies in response to a neutral technology shock.
Apart from that, we calibrate our model to a European economy and compare its
dynamic behavior with the US model economy. The European model economy diﬀers
in terms of a greater price rigidity parameter, a greater real wage rigidity parameter,
and a larger degree of matching frictions in the labor market. In particular, we account
for the fact that European transition rates between employment and unemployment are
considerably lower. The higher value of the average European unemployment rate is
mainly due to a more generous replacement ratio.
In response to a monetary policy shock, we observe that the decline in output and total
labor input is larger and more protracted in the European model economy. The impulse
response of inﬂation, however, shows a smaller impact response and a more persistent
adjustment path. These three observations can be attributed to the greater price rigidity
parameter. Further, the impulse response of the European unemployment rate exhibits
a clear hump-shape. In the US model economy, on the contrary, the unemployment rate
spikes on impact and then converges quickly to its steady state value. This pattern is
mainly explained by the smaller value of the job separation rate which delays labor market
turnover.
When the two model economies are hit by a neutral technology shock, we observe
more interdependencies between the three frictions considered. On the one hand, the
larger degree of price rigidity raises the amplitude of output and inﬂation. On the other
hand, the larger degree of real wage rigidity dampens the amplitude and delays the speed
of convergence. In total, the amplitude of both impulse responses remains almost con-
stant, but convergence is slower under the European calibration. Again, the labor market
calibration aﬀects primarily the response of the unemployment rate. First, we note that
the percentage impact response of the European unemployment rate is only about 1/4
of the US value. Second, in the same way as above, greater price rigidity increases the
amplitude of the unemployment rate, while a large degree of real wage rigidity dampens
the ﬂuctuations. As a result, the joint impact of the two Calvo type rigidities raises the
persistence of the unemployment rate, but leave its amplitude virtually unchanged.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
environment. Section 3 calibrates the model and evaluates its quantitative performance.
We investigate the mechanism of the right-to-manage bargaining model based on a cali-
bration to the US economy. In addition, we examine the diﬀerences between the US and
a European model economy. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model Environment
2.1 Labor Market Frictions
Labor market frictions are represented by a Cobb-Douglas matching function that relates
aggregate job matches Mt to the number of vacancies that are posted by the ﬁrms Vt and
the number of unemployed job searchers Ut−1:3
Mt(Vt, Ut−1) = χV
µ
t U
1−µ
t−1 ≤ min[Vt, Ut−1]. (1)
The ratio between vacancies and unemployed job searchers (Vt/Ut−1 = θt) measures
the tightness of the labor market. By linear homogeneity of the matching function, the
vacancy ﬁlling rate q(θt) and the job ﬁnding rate q(θt)θt depend solely on the value of
labor market tightness:
q(θt) ≡
Mt
Vt
= χ
(
Ut−1
Vt
)1−µ
, q(θt)θt ≡
Mt
Ut−1
= χ
(
Vt
Ut−1
)µ
. (2)
The tighter the labor market, the longer the expected time to ﬁll a vacancy, but
the shorter the expected search for a job (and vice versa). The fact that ﬁrms and
households do not internalize these adverse eﬀects on the aggregate return rates gives rise
to congestion externalities.
At the end of each period, new job matches are formed and a fraction of pre-existing
jobs is terminated. Consistent with the results of Shimer (2007), we assume a constant
job destruction rate ρ. Hence, the law of motion for the aggregate level of employment is
given by:
Nt = (1− ρ)Nt−1 +Mt. (3)
Moreover, we assume that the real wage rate is subject to staggered wage contracts
(Calvo 1983). This implies that — new and ongoing — ﬁrm-worker pairs are able to
bargain over the real wage rate w∗t only with probability (1 − ωw). Otherwise, the real
wage rate in ongoing ﬁrm-worker pairs remains constant. New ﬁrm-worker pairs that
are unable to negotiate simply adopt the average real wage rate of the previous period
wt−1.4 Hence, the evolution of the average real wage rate wt is governed by following law
of motion:
wt = ωwwt−1 + (1− ωw)w∗t . (4)
3We follow the textbook job matching model (Pissarides 1985, 2000) that abstracts from movements
into and out of the labor force. Hence, Ut = 1−Nt holds.
4As demonstrated by Haefke et al. (2009) and Pissarides (2009), wages in new hires are significantly
more volatile than wages in incumbent matches. Under right-to-manage wage bargaining, however,
accounting for this aspect hardy changes the quantitative results (Christoffel et al. 2009). For this reason,
we choose the described set-up for analytical convenience.
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2.2 Households
There is a large number of households, each of which consists of a continuum of individuals.
Household members derive utility from the composite consumption good Cj,t and real
money holdings (M/P )j,t. Employed household members additionally suﬀer disutility
from working time hj,t. Hence, preferences of an individual household member j are given
as:
U (Cj,t, (M/P )j,t, hj,t) =
(Cj,t − ψcCj,t−1)
1−σc
1− σc
+ ψq
(M/P )1−σqj,t
1− σq
− ψf

 h1+σfj,t
1 + σf

 , (5)
where ψc measures the degree of habit persistence in consumption and 1/σf denotes the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the supply of hours worked.
Employed and unemployed household members insure each other completely against
idiosyncratic income risk from unemployment (Merz 1995, Andolfatto 1996). Thus, the
budget constraint of the representative household can be written as:
Ct + It + (M/P )t +Bt + a (xt) k¯t−1 =
∫ Nt−1
0
wj,thj,tdj + bUt−1 +Πt + rtKt
+
(M/P )t−1
πt
+
Rt−1
πt
Bt−1 − Tt. (6)
Employed household members earn the real wage rate wj,t per working hour hj,t, while
unemployed household members Ut−1 receive unemployment beneﬁts b. The lump-sum
transfer Tt imposed by the government ﬁnances unemployment beneﬁts, governmental
consumption, and rebates any seigniorage revenue to the households (see section 2.6).
Government bonds Bt pay a nominal interest rate Rt in period t+1. Moreover, households
receive lump-sum dividends5 Πt remitted by ﬁrms and capital income rtKt. Eﬀective
capital servicesKt are given by the physical capital stock K¯t−1 times the capital utilization
rate xt. Following (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe 2004), the costs of variations in the degree of
capital utilization are given as:
a (xt) =
χa
2
(xt − 1)
2 + χb(xt − 1). (7)
Hence, provided that the steady state value of capital utilization is normalized to
unity, the steady state of the model economy will be independent of a(xt), i.e. a(1) = 0.
Nevertheless, capital adjustment costs aﬀect the utilization elasticity with respect to the
rental rate of capital: [a′(x)/(a′′(x) x)]|x=1 = χb/χa.
5Aggregate dividends Πt = Πy +Πn are given as the sum of dividends remitted by intermediate good
firms and hiring firms, respectively.
5
Furthermore, the law of motion for the physical capital stock is given by:
K¯t = (1− δ) K¯t−1 +
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It, (8)
where S (·) =
χs
2
(
It − It−1
It−1
)2
, (9)
is restricted to satisfy S(1) = S ′(1) = 0 and S ′′(1) = χs > 0. The law of motion for the
household’s employment share reads as follows:
Nt = (1− ρ)Nt−1 + qtθtUt−1. (10)
2.2.1 First Order Conditions
Provided stochastic time paths for
{
Rt, rt,Πt, πt, θt, Tt, h˜t| ≥ 0
}
, and a set of initial con-
ditions for the state variables
{
K¯0, N0, w˜0
}
, the representative household chooses contin-
gency plans
{
Ct, xt, Bt,Mt, It, K¯t|t ≥ 0
}
that maximize its expected discounted utility:6
Ut
(
K¯t−1, Nt−1, w˜t
)
= max
Ct,xt,Bt,Mt,It,k¯t
{
U(Ct, (M/P )t, h˜t) + βUt+1(K¯t, Nt, w˜t+1)
}
(11)
These choices have to satisfy following ﬁrst order conditions:
λc,t = (Ct − ψcCt−1)
−σc − βEt
[
ψc(Ct+1 − ψcCt)−σc
]
, (12)
rt = a′(xt) = χa(xt − 1) + χb, (13)
λc,t = βEt
[
λc,t+1
πt+1
]
Rt, (14)
λc,t =
[
ψq(M/P )
−σq
t
]
+ βEt
[
λc,t+1
πt+1
]
⇔
(
M
P
)σq
=
ψq
λc,t
Rt
Rt − 1
, (15)
λc,t = λk,t
[(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
−
(
It
It−1
)
χs
(
It − It−1
It−1
)]
+βEt
[
λk,t+1χs
(
It+1 − It
It
)(
It+1
It
)2]
, (16)
Qt =
λk,t
λc,t
= βEt
{(
λc,t+1
λc,t
)
(Qt+1(1− δ)− a(xt+1) + rt+1xt+1)
}
. (17)
The ﬁrst order conditions describe the marginal utility of consumption (12), the rela-
tion between the rental rate of capital r and the utilization rate xt (13), the Euler equation
for government bonds (14), the demand for real money holdings (15), optimal investment
(16), and the real value of physical capital (17).
6The distribution of real wages and hours over matched firm-worker pairs is denoted by w˜t and h˜t,
respectively.
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2.2.2 The Net Benefit of Additional Employment
The net marginal beneﬁt to the household when an unemployed household member ﬁnds
a job is given by the following expression:
Wt (wj,t) =
(
∂Ut
∂Nt−1
)
−
(
∂Ut
∂Ut−1
)
= λc,t[wj,thj,t − b]− ψf
(
h
1+σf
j,t /1 + σf
)
(18)
+ωwβEt [(1− ρ)W(wj,t)− q(θt)θtW(wt)]
+(1− ωw)(1− ρ− q(θt)θt)βEt
[
W2(w∗t+1)
]
.
One additional employed household member increases the net income of the household,
but suﬀers disutility from working time. Besides that, the household gains the continua-
tion value of the current real wage rateW(wj,t) with probability (1−ρ)ωw, the continuation
value of the re-negotiated real wage rate W(w∗j,t+1) with probability (1− ρ)(1− ωw), and
loses the continuation value of unemployment. The latter is determined by the job ﬁnding
rate q(θt)θt, the expected value of a job that pays the average real wage rate W(wt), and
the expected value of a job that pays the re-negotiated real wage rate W(w∗j,t+1).
2.3 The Composite Consumption Good
The composite consumption good consists of a CES aggregate of diﬀerentiated interme-
diate goods:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
C
(ξp−1)/ξp
it di
]ξp/(ξp−1)
, (19)
where ξp > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated intermediate goods
Cit. Given that Pit denotes the price for intermediate good i, equation (19) implies that
its relative demand is given as:
Ci,t
Ct
=
(
Pit
Pt
)−ξp
. (20)
Integrating (20) and imposing (19), we obtain the associated minimum expenditure
price index:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P
1−ξp
i,t di
]1/(1−ξp)
. (21)
2.4 Intermediate Good Firms
Each intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a single ﬁrm and sold in a market
characterized by monopolistic competition.7 The productive process in this sector can be
described by a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale:
Y (Kt, Lt) = ǫztK
α
t L
1−α
t , (22)
7Given symmetry, we will drop the subscript i in the following.
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where ǫzt represents total factor productivity subject to an exogenous shock speciﬁed by
the following autoregressive process:
ǫzt = ρzǫ
z
t−1 + ι
z
t , where ι
z
t ∼ N(0, σ
2
ιz). (23)
Following de Walque et al. (2009), we assume perfect competition on the factor mar-
kets. Intermediate good ﬁrms rent capital services Kt directly from the households and
labor services Lt from hiring ﬁrms. Constant returns to scale in production in combi-
nation with price-taking behavior on the factor markets yield following factor prices for
capital (rt) and labor services (Wt), respectively:
rt = λy,tY1(Kt, Lt), (24)
Wt = λy,tY2(Kt, Lt). (25)
This implies that the real marginal cost λy,t can be written as:
λy,t =
1
ǫzt
(
rt
α
)α ( Wt
1− α
)1−α
. (26)
On the product market, intermediate good ﬁrms face Calvo (1983) type restrictions
in price setting. In the beginning of period t, only a fraction 1− ωp of intermediate good
ﬁrms is able to re-optimize the price of its variety. Intermediate good ﬁrms that cannot
re-optimize simply index their prices to lagged inﬂation πt−1. This speciﬁcation yields
following log-linearized New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
πˆt =
1
1 + β
πˆt−1 + Et
[
β
1 + β
πˆt+1
]
+
(1− ωp)(1− βωp)
ωp (1 + β)
λˆy,t. (27)
2.5 Employment relations
2.5.1 Hiring Firms
Labor services are provided by specialized hiring ﬁrms (Christoﬀel & Kuester 2008).
There is a continuum of potential hiring ﬁrms on the unit interval. Each hiring ﬁrm
can hire at most one worker j. Hiring ﬁrms with ﬁlled positions Nt−1 produce labor ser-
vices according to a decreasing returns to scale technology H(hj,t) = h
σh
j,t , with σh < 1.
Hence, the units of aggregate labor services Lt produced in period t are given by:
Lt = Nt−1H(h˜t) =
∫ Nt−1
0
hσhj,tdj =
∫ 1
0
Li,tdi (28)
The hiring ﬁrm j rents the amount H(hj,t) of labor services to intermediate good ﬁrms
at rate Wt on a competitive market. The worker receives the real wage rate wj,t per hour
worked hj,t.
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If the match survives exogenous job destruction at the end of period t, the ﬁrm and
the worker may re-negotiate the real wage rate with probability (1− ωw) in period t+ 1.
Otherwise, the real wage rate remains constant. Hence, the value of a ﬁlled position to
the hiring ﬁrm reads as:
Jt(wj,t) =WtH(hj,t)− wj,thj,t + (1− ρ)βEt
[(
λc,t+1
λc,t
)(
ωwJt+1(wj,t) + (1− ωw)Jt+1(w
∗
t+1)
)]
.
(29)
Hiring ﬁrms with unﬁlled positions may decide whether or not to open a vacancy.
Posting a vacancy entails a cost κ per period. Therefore, the hiring ﬁrm can expect to
gain the value of a ﬁlled position Jt+1 with probability q(θt) in the next period. With
probability 1− q(θt) the vacancy remains unﬁlled. Upon matching, the ﬁrm-worker pair
j will be able to bargain over the real wage rate w∗t+1 with probability (1 − ωw). If the
hiring ﬁrm and the worker are unable to bargain, they will adopt the average real wage
rate of the previous period, i.e. wt. Thus, the value of an unﬁlled vacancy Vt is given as:
Vt = −κ+ βEt
[(
λc,t+1
λc,t
)(
q(θt)
{
ωwJt+1(wt) + (1− ωw)Jt+1(w
∗
t+1)
}
+ [1− q(θt)]Vt+1
)]
.
(30)
Free entry into the matching market ensures that the hiring ﬁrm’s outside option,
i.e. the value of an unﬁlled vacancy, is zero in each period: Vt = 0 ∀ t. Hence, the
non-arbitrage condition for vacancy creation is given by:
κ
q(θt)
= βEt
[(
λc,t+1
λc,t
) [
ωwJt+1(wt) + (1− ωw)Jt+1(w∗t+1)
]]
. (31)
2.5.2 Right-to-Manage Wage Bargaining
Right-to-manage wage bargaining (Trigari 2006), in contrast, presumes following sequen-
tial setting: First, both parties agree on a real wage rate wt according to the Nash rule.
Second, the hiring ﬁrm may choose the number of hours per worker hj,t unilaterally. Thus,
the hiring ﬁrm sets hours per worker in order to maximize Jt:
wj,t = σhWt
H(hj,t)
hj,t
(32)
⇔ ht(wj,t) =
(
σh
Wt
wj,t
)1/(1−σh)
(33)
The ﬁrst order condition (32) states that hiring ﬁrms set hours per worker such that
the real wage rate equals the marginal product per hour worked. Provided that σh is close
to one, this implies that movements in the average real wage rate wt translate almost one-
to-one into changes in the competitive price of labor services Wt and, thus, into real
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marginal costs λy,t. This feature of the right-to-manage bargaining model is referred to
as the “wage channel”.
Furthermore, equation (33) points out that hours per worker under right-to-manage are
a function of the real wage rate. During the wage bargaining, both parties internalize the
impact of the real wage rate on the number of hours per worker. Hence, the maximization
of the Nash product yields following sharing rule:
η
(
∂ (Wt(wj,t)/λc,t)
∂wj,t
) ∣∣∣∣∣
∗
J ∗t = (1− η)
(
−
∂Jt(wj,t)
∂wj,t
) ∣∣∣∣∣
∗
(W∗t /λc,t) , (34)
where 0 < η < 1 denotes the relative (“nominal”) bargaining power of the household.
The net marginal beneﬁt of an increase in the real wage rate to the worker, and the loss
to the hiring ﬁrm, respectively, are given as:8
δWt =
(
∂ (Wt(wj,t)/λc,t)
∂wj,t
) ∣∣∣∣
∗
w∗t
=
w∗t h
∗
t
1− σh
[
1
w∗t
(
ψf
(h∗t )
σf
λc,t
)
− σh
]
+ (1− ρ)βωwEt
[(
λc,t+1
λc,t
)(
w∗t+1
w∗t
)(1+σf )/(1−σh)
(35)
w∗t+1
∞∑
k=1
1
1− σh
(
σh
Wt+k
wj,t+k
)1/(1−σh)(
1
wj,t+k
)(
ψf
λc,t
)(
σh
Wt+k
wj,t+k
)ψf/(1−σh) ]
−(1− ρ)βωwEt

(λc,t+1
λc,t
)(
w∗t+1
w∗t
)σh/(1−σh)
w∗t+1
∞∑
k=1
σh
1− σh
(
σh
Wt+k
wj,t+k
)1/(1−σh)
δFt =
(
−
∂Jt(wi,t)
∂wi,t
) ∣∣∣∣
∗
w∗t
= w∗t h
∗
t + (1− ρ)βωwEt
[(
λc,t+1
λc,t
)(
w∗t+1
w∗t
)σh/(1−σh)]
. (36)
Thus, using equations (18), (25), (28), (29), and (34) the steady-state wage equation
can be written as:
wh = η∗

λy(1− α)Y
n
+ κθ

+ (1− η∗)
[
b+
ψf
λc
h1+σf
1 + σf
]
, (37)
where the eﬀective bargaining weight η∗t is a time-dependent variable:
η∗t =
ηδWt
ηδWt + (1− η)δFt
. (38)
8We have multiplied both expressions with the re-negotiated real wage rate w∗t .
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2.6 Government and Monetary Authority
The government ﬁnances unemployment beneﬁts b, issues bonds Bt that pay a nominal
interest rate Rt in period t+ 1, and consumes a constant share of output Gt = gYt. Any
seigniorage revenue is rebated to the households. Each period, the budget balance is
maintained by imposing a lump-sum tax Tt:
Tt + (M/P )t +Bt = bUt−1 +
(M/P )t−1
πt
+Bt−1
Rt−1
πt
+Gt. (39)
Monetary policy obeys a generalized Taylor (1993) rule:
Rt
R
=

Rt−1
Rt


φr (πt
π
)φpi(Yt
Y
)φy
(1−φr)
exp (ǫrt ) , (40)
where ǫrt is a serially uncorrelated, mean zero stochastic process and φpi > 1. Accordingly,
the monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate depending on the lagged
nominal interest rate Rt−1, current inﬂation πt, and the current level of economic activity
Yt (Clarida et al. 2000).
2.7 Market Clearing
The model economy is closed by the resource constraint. It postulates that output is
divided into private consumption, investment, government consumption, vacancy posting
costs, and capital utilization costs.
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + κVt + a (xt) k¯t−1. (41)
3 Model Evaluation
3.1 Calibration US
We analyze the cyclical behavior of the log-linearized model economy around the non-
stochastic steady state. The parameters are chosen to be largely consistent with those
standard in the literature. The time period of the model corresponds to one quarter.
Preferences The discount factor β is chosen to match an annual real interest rate of
4 percent (Kydland & Prescott 1982). Following Christiano et al. (2005), we assume log-
arithmic preferences in consumption (σc = 1), together with external habit formation
(ψc = 0.65). In addition, we borrow their estimates for the interest semi-elasticity of
money demand (0.96, implying σq = 6.3) and the elasticity of substitution between diﬀer-
entiated intermediate goods (ξp = 6). The latter value implies that the average mark-up
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((1/λy) − 1) is equal to 20%. For the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply (1/σf ) we
target a value that lies within the range [0.3 – 0.7] estimated by MaCurdy (1983).
Production and the Capital Market The monthly depreciation rate δ is set to match
an annual rate of 10% (Kydland & Prescott 1982). In addition, we adopt following two
parameters from Christiano et al. (2005): First, we set α = 0.36 which corresponds to a
steady state labor share slightly below 64%.9 Second, the scaling parameter of the invest-
ment adjustment cost function (χs = 2) is chosen such that the elasticity of investment
with respect to a one percent temporary increase in the current price of installed capital
is equal to 0.4. Our chosen value for the elasticity of capital utilization with respect to
the rental rate of capital (χb/χa) = 1 is close to the estimate by Smets & Wouters (2007).
Matching and the Labor Market Following Shimer (2005), we target an average
unemployment rate U = 5.7% and a steady state job ﬁnding rate q(θ)θ = 83.4%. This
requires setting the job destruction rate ρ equal to 5% (Davis & Haltiwanger 1990). More-
over, we assume that unemployment beneﬁts b = repb W as well as the steady state leisure
gain from unemployment
ψf
λc,t
h
1+σf
t
1 + σf
= reph W = reph λy(1− α)(Y/N), (42)
can be quantiﬁed as percentage of the competitive price of labor services W . This allows
us to derive an expression which we can solve for the steady state (un)employment rate
in closed form. Therefore, we plug the vacancy ﬁlling rate (31), the steady state job ﬂow
condition (3), and the wage equation (37) into the job creation condition (31):
N
1−N
=
[(1− η∗)(1− α)(1− (repb + reph))λyY ]− [(κV/βρ)(1− β(1− ρ))]
η∗κV
(43)
We parameterize equation (43) as follows: Effective bargaining power is assumed to be
symmetrically distributed, i.e. η∗ = 0.5 (Svejnar 1986). Unemployment beneﬁts repb =
0.36 are calibrated using OECD (2006, p. 60) data on the net replacement rate. Average
vacancy posting costs are set to the standard value of κV = 1% (Hamermesh & Pfann
1996, p. 1278). Output Y is normalized to unity. Given these values, we have to set
reph = 28.5% in order to replicate an average unemployment rate U = 5.7%. Thus, the
total replacement ratio is equal to repb + reph = 64.5%. Our calibration implies that the
semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to the replacement rate is equal to 3. This
value lies within the range of estimates by Costain & Reiter (2008).10
9In labor search models the labor share is slightly lower than the production elasticity of labor.
10As a further robustness check, we reduce unemployment benefits by 10 percentage points. This
implies that the steady state unemployment rate falls by 1.3 percentage points, which is in line with the
results of Bassanini & Duval (2006).
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The matching elasticity of vacancies (µ = 0.5) does not aﬀect the steady state of the
model economy, but its cyclical behavior. We set µ = 0.5, which is within the interval
[0.3, 0.5] proposed by Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001). Moreover, our choice (µ = η∗)
satisﬁes the Hosios (1990) condition. Finally, we set the steady state vacancy ﬁlling rate
q(θ) to 0.7 (van Ours & Ridder 1992).11
Right-to-Manage Bargaining Given that average working time h is normalized to
unity (Trigari 2006), we can derive an expression for labor eﬃciency σh, using the com-
petitive price of labor services (25), the value of a job to the ﬁrm (29), the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst
order condition for hours per worker (32), and the job creation condition (31):
σh = 0.9775 = 1−
(κV/ρβ)(1− β(1− ρ))
λy(1− α)H(h)
. (44)
This value is close to constant returns to scale (Christoﬀel & Kuester 2008). We then
assume that worker’s “nominal” and eﬀective bargaining power are equal in the steady
state, i.e. η = η∗ = 0.5. This implies that, in the steady state, the net marginal beneﬁt of
an increase in the real wage rate to the worker (δW ) equals the net marginal loss to the
hiring ﬁrm (δF ). According to equations (35) and (36), this condition holds if the real
wage rate w equals the marginal rate of substitution. This requires setting σh = 2.43, a
value that is consistent with the results of MaCurdy (1983).
Government and Monetary Policy We calibrate the share of governmental con-
sumption in total output g to 18% (Smets & Wouters 2007), which implies an average
consumption share (C/Y ) of about 56%. The ratio of nominal output P Y to the mone-
tary aggregate M , i.e. the velocity of money, is set to 0.36 (Christiano et al. 2005). The
values chosen for the generalized Taylor rule (φr = 0.8, φpi = 2.0, φy = 0.3) are taken from
Gertler et al. (2008).
Price and Wage Rigidities We adopt the Calvo (1983) price (ωp = 0.60) and wage
(ωw = 0.65) rigidity parameters estimated by Christiano et al. (2005).
Stochastic Processes We calibrate the law of motion for the technology shock using
the conventional values (ρz = 0.95, ιz = 0.007) suggested by Cooley & Prescott (1995).
The standard deviation of the monetary policy shock (ιm = 0.002) is taken from Walsh
(2005).
11As demonstrated by Shimer (2005), the model allows for the normalization of the vacancy filling rate.
Nevertheless, we choose a meaningful value.
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3.2 Calibration France
Our analysis focuses on the impact of staggered prices, staggered wages, and the size
of labor market ﬂows. Hence, in order to facilitate comparability with the US model
economy, we only alter the respective parameters (Table 2). Following Álvarez et al.
(2006), we set the degree of price rigidity ωFp = 0.75. The parameter governing the
degree of wage rigidity (ωFw = 0.83) is chosen in accordance with du Caju et al. (2008).
Furthermore, we target the average French unemployment rate between 1978:2007, i.e.
UF = 9.0% (OECD 2008b). Given that the French job ﬁnding rate exhibits almost
no duration dependence (Hobijn & Şahin 2009, Elsby et al. 2009), we approximate the
steady-state job ﬁnding rate (qF (θF )θF = 21.3%) by the average fraction of workers
unemployed for less than three months (OECD 2008a). These values imply an average job
separation rate equal to ρF = 2.36%.12 The amount of French unemployment beneﬁts is
calibrated to repFb = 0.57 (OECD 2006). We then set the leisure gain from unemployment
repFl = 0.188 in order to match the average French unemployment rate (Equation 43).
Finally, we choose σFf = 4.19, such that η
∗ = η holds. The implied value of labor eﬃciency
(σFh = 0.9723, Equation 44) remains almost unchanged.
3.3 Inspecting the Mechanism of Staggered Wage Contracts
This section examines the dynamic behavior of a New Keynesian business cycle model with
right-to-manage wage bargaining. Our computations are performed using Dynare 4.0.2
(Juillard 1996). Table (1) presents the impulse responses of the US model economy to an
innovation in monetary policy, given diﬀerent values of the real wage rigidity parameter
(ωw = {0.00, 0.01, 0.65, 0.83}). Table (2) repeats the same exercise for a neutral technology
shock. The graphs depict the evolution of the impulse responses over 32 quarters.
Impulse Responses to an Innovation in Monetary Policy The impulse responses
reveal that staggered wage contracts are an eﬀective means to reduce the elasticity of
the average real wage rate. Even if there is only a very small share of matches that are
unable to re-negotiate (ωw = 0.01), we observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the dynamic
behavior of the real wage rate compared to the fully ﬂexible wage regime (ωw = 0.00).
If we increase the wage rigidity parameter until it equals the value estimated for the US
economy (ωw = 0.60), the elasticity of the real wage rate decreases further. However, the
value estimated for France (ωw = 0.83) generates almost the same impulse response as
the US value.
Since labor eﬃciency σh is close to unity, the impulse responses of the average real wage
rate wt and of the competitive price of labor services Wt match each other almost exactly.
12Our values are almost identical to the ones of Sigrist (2009), who estimates an average job finding
rate equal to 20.1% and an average job separation rate equal to 2.4% for France on a quarterly basis.
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Moreover, Equation (26) shows that the competitive price of labor services feeds directly
into the determination of real marginal costs λy,t. Hence, any rigidity in the average real
wage rate is transmitted via the competitive price of labor services into the dynamic time
path of real marginal costs. This implies that real wage rigidity under right-to-manage
wage bargaining is able to reduce the elasticity of real marginal costs. The New Keynesian
Phillips Curve entails that these sluggish dynamics translate into persistent movements of
inﬂation. The direct link between real wage rigidity and inﬂation persistence established
by the right-to-manage bargaining model is known as the “wage channel” (Trigari 2006).
Furthermore, we note that the model is not only capable to generate persistent re-
sponses in inﬂation, but also in output and total labor input. The so-called wage channel
established by the right-to-manage bargaining approach increases not only the persistence
of inﬂation, but dampens also the response of the real interest rate. In the case of variable
capital utilization, this implies that the input of capital services responds more sluggishly.
Consequently, given that matching frictions induce a lagged response in total labor input,
we note that the response of aggregate output reaches its minimum not impact, but just
in the second period after an innovation in monetary policy.
The mechanism behind staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining can be described as
follows. Firm j is able to set unilaterally the proﬁt maximizing number of hour per worker
hj,t, given the spread between the real wage wj,t paid in match j and the competitive price
of labor services Wt (Equation 33). Recall that the impulse responses of the average real
wage rate wt and of the competitive price of labor services Wt match each other almost
exactly. Hiring ﬁrms that are unable to re-negotiate, however, may be forced to pay a real
wage rate wj,t that is quite diﬀerent from the competitive price of labor services. Hence,
given that labor eﬃciency σh is close to unity, these ﬁrms tend to adjust the number of
hours per worker drastically.13
Following three impulse response functions illustrate the consequences of right-to-
manage wage bargaining: (i) the number of hours per worker associated with the average
real wage rate wt,14 (ii) the number of hours per worker associated with the re-negotiated
real wage rate w∗t , and (iii) the number of hours per worker associated with the lagged
average real wage rate wt−1. In the case of fully ﬂexible real wages, the average real
wage rate and the re-negotiated real wage rate are identical, and so are the corresponding
impulse responses of hours per worker. Yet, even if there is only a very small share of
ﬁrms that is unable to re-negotiate (ωw = 0.01), we note that these ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal
to adjust the number of hours per worker to a large extent. In response to an innovation
in monetary policy, the impulse response of hours per worker associated with the lagged
13This is a distinct feature of the right-to-manage bargaining model with staggered wage contracts.
Only if the number of hours per worker depends on the real wage rate, a dispersion of hours per worker
can emerge.
14In our first order approximation, the number of hours per worker associated with the average real
wage rate is equal to the average number of hours per worker (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe 2004).
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average real wage rate h(wt−1) plummets on impact by more than 60% and then shoots
up sharply, peaking at approximately 40% above its steady-state value after 3 quarters.
Given that the average number of hours per worker h(wt) remains almost unchanged,
large movements in h(wt−1) imply a signiﬁcant change in the adjustment pattern of hours
per worker associated with the re-negotiated real wage rate h(w∗t ). In the case of fully
ﬂexible wages, the impulse response of h(w∗t ) shows a negative spike on impact and a
fast convergence to its steady-state value. But if only 1% of the wage contracts is not
re-negotiated in every period, the impulse response shows a clear hump-shape and a
considerably slower speed of convergence.
We emphasize this issue, since the impulse response of the number of hours per worker
associated with the re-negotiated real wage rate h(w∗t ) is of great importance for the
dynamics of the whole model economy. In particular, the movements in h(w∗t ) determine
the sign of the response of the eﬀective bargaining weight η∗t . This implies that movements
in h(w∗t ) feed back into the re-negotiated real wage rate w
∗
t . If wages are fully ﬂexible,
an innovation in monetary policy induces a fall in the eﬀective bargaining weight of the
household which accounts for approximately 2/3rd of the reduction in the re-negotiated
real wage rate w∗t . With increasing real wage rigidity, instead, the bargaining weight of the
household raises on impact by 3% and, hence, stabilizes the re-negotiated real wage rate.
This explains why the impulse response of the re-negotiated real wage w∗t rate matches
the impulse response of the average real wage rate wt almost exactly.
Impulse Responses to a Neutral Technology Shock This section analyzes the
eﬀects of a neutral technology shock on the dynamic behavior of the model economy.
Consistent with the results of Ravn & Simonelli (2008), Figure (2) shows that the impact
response of employment is positive, and then continues to rise until it reaches a maximum
after about 6 quarters.15 Real wage rigidity clearly ampliﬁes the response of the employ-
ment level. Hours per worker, on the other hand, show a negative impact response. In
the following periods, however, the average number of hours per worker rises dramatically
and peaks after about 6 quarters. Comparing the elasticities of the employment level and
hours per worker, we note that ﬁrms adjust employment primarily through the intensive
margin. This prediction is not consistent with the data (see below). For this reason, we
observe that the responses of total labor input and hours per worker are very similar.
Total labor input remains below its steady-state value in the ﬁrst few quarters after a
neutral technology shock. As soon as prices adjust, intermediate good ﬁrms expand out-
put and tend to demand more labor services from the hiring ﬁrms. Hence, total labor
input follows a hump-shaped pattern. This implies that output and total labor input are
positively correlated at the business cycle frequencies in response to a neutral technology
15In our model, Nt = 1 − Ut holds (see Footnote 3). Hence, the responses of employment and unem-
ployment are symmetric.
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shock (ρX,Y=0.95, see Table 3). Furthermore, the expansion in aggregate output induces
the monetary authority to raise the nominal interest rate. Thus, we observe a pronounced
U-shape in the impulse response of inﬂation.
Staggered wage contracts reduce the elasticity of the real wage in the same way as
in response to monetary policy shocks. But, in contrast to the last section, real wage
rigidity now increases the amplitude of the ﬂuctuations in the average number of hours
per worker. As a result, the elasticity of average labor costs wtht rises, the more rigid is
the real wage rate. This surprising outcome is due to the fact that hiring ﬁrms that are
unable to re-negotiate tend to increase the number of hours per worker hj,t enormously.
Hiring ﬁrms that are able to re-negotiate, instead, even decrease the number of hours per
worker h∗t slightly.
In order to study the consequences of right-to-manage wage bargaining for the dynam-
ics of the labor market, we recall that the incentive of a potential hiring ﬁrm to open a
new vacancy is provided by the discounted ﬂow of expected proﬁts. Moreover, as shown
by Christoﬀel & Kuester (2008), right-to-manage bargaining entails that the proﬁt ﬂow
of a hiring ﬁrm Πj,n is proportional to its labor costs wj,thj,t:
Πj,n(t) = WtH(hj,t)− wj,thj,t = ((1− σh)/σh)wj,thj,t (45)
In other words, the model predicts that (un)employment ﬂuctuates stronger, the more
volatile are labor costs. For this reason, the introduction of real wage rigidity ampliﬁes
the volatility of the labor market variables. It does so, however, not because labor costs
are more rigid, but because labor costs are more volatile.
In addition to that, we note that real wage rigidity raises the elasticity of output by
a large extent. The increase in the elasticity of aggregate output is mainly driven by
adjustments in the average number of hours per worker. Since ﬁrms are able to adjust
the number of hours per worker unilaterally, they do so extensively. This explains why
right-to-manage bargaining model with staggered wage contracts is able to increase the
absolute volatility of the labor market, but not the relative movements of unemployment
with respect to aggregate output (see also Table 3). Hence, our model cannot replicate the
stylized the stylized business cycle fact that most of the variation in total labor input is
due to movements into and out of employment rather than to adjustments in the average
number of hours per worker (see Section 3.4).
This ﬁnding clearly contradicts previous work by Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005), which
suggests that real wage rigidity establishes an important ampliﬁcation mechanism for the
labor market. The opposing implications are driven by diﬀerences in the underlying bar-
gaining process. Under Nash bargaining, as assumed by Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005),
the real wage rate wt splits the mutual surplus, while hours per worker ht are set indepen-
dently of the actual real wage rate in order to maximize the mutual surplus. Maximization
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of the mutual surplus requires that the marginal product of labor is equal to the marginal
rate of substitution (Cheron & Langot 2004). This has three important implications.
First, as shown by Trigari (2006), the marginal rate of substitution is the main determi-
nant of the dynamics of real marginal costs — and not the real wage rate. Second, the
proﬁt ﬂow of hiring ﬁrms is not proportional to labor costs. Consequently, models with
Nash bargaining and real wage rigidity (Krause & Lubik 2007) do not exhibit a “wage
channel”, but are capable to amplify the relative volatility of the labor market. Third,
the real wage rate is not allocative for hours per worker. Hence, the eﬀective bargaining
weight is constant and unable to absorb any shocks.
3.4 A Transatlantic Perspective
This section examines the impact of country-speciﬁc frictions on the dynamic behavior of
the model economy. In particular, we focus on diﬀerences in the price rigidity parameter,
the wage rigidity parameter, and in the degree of matching frictions in the labor market.
In particular, we account for the fact that European transition rates between employment
and unemployment are considerably lower. The higher value of the average unemployment
rate is mainly due to a more generous replacement ratio. We then evaluate the model
calibrated to the US (Section 3.1) against the model calibrated to the French economy
(Section 3.2). In order to disentangle the eﬀects of these frictions, we additionally evaluate
two counter-factual model economies: (i) the model calibrated to France, but with prices
ﬂexible as in the US and (ii) the model calibrated to France, but with prices and wages
ﬂexible as in the US. The latter model exhibits the same Calvo type rigidity parameters
as the US model economy, but diﬀers in the calibration of the labor market.
Impulse Responses to an Innovation in Monetary Policy Table (3) shows that the
degree of price rigidity plays a dominant role in the determination of aggregate inﬂation. If
prices change more frequently, the impulse response function is considerably more elastic
and immediate. The more ﬂexible response of US prices entails that aggregate output
falls by less and converges much faster to its steady state value. Quite surprisingly, the
higher degree of real wage rigidity in France has no signiﬁcant impact on the responses of
inﬂation and output. Furthermore, we observe that the impulse response of the French
unemployment rate exhibits a clear hump-shape. In the US model economy, on the
contrary, the unemployment rate spikes on impact and then converges quickly to its
steady state value. This pattern is mainly explained by the smaller value of the job
separation rate which delays labor market turnover.
In summary, the model indicates that the transmission of an innovation in monetary
policy to the economy is mainly determined by the degree of price rigidity. The degree of
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real wage rigidity, in contrast, seems to be less important.16. In addition, we ﬁnd out that
central banks concerned about the stabilization of employment should closely monitor the
transition rates between the diﬀerent labor market states.
Impulse Responses to a Neutral Technology Shock When the two model econo-
mies are hit by a neutral technology shock (Table 4), we observe more interdependencies
between the three frictions considered. On the one hand, the larger degree of price rigidity
raises the amplitude of output and inﬂation. On the other hand, the larger degree of real
wage rigidity dampens the amplitude and delays the speed of convergence. In total, the
amplitude of both impulse responses remains almost constant, but convergence is slower
under the French calibration. Again, the labor market calibration aﬀects primarily the
response of the unemployment rate. First, we note that the percentage impact response
of the French unemployment rate is only about 1/4 of the US value. Second, in the same
way as above, greater price rigidity increases the amplitude of the unemployment rate,
while a large degree of real wage rigidity dampens the ﬂuctuations. As a result, the joint
impact of the two Calvo type rigidities raises the persistence of the unemployment rate,
but leave its amplitude virtually unchanged.
Discussion of the Second Moments Table (3) illustrates the unconditional second
moments of the US economy, the French economy, and the conditional model generated
data. As is well known, US labor market ﬂuctuations are very volatile and persistent. The
US unemployment rate is about 7 times as volatile as output, vacancies even more. This
stylized fact has attracted much attention in the recent literature.17 Total labor input is
about as volatile as output. Most of its variability seems to be due to variations in the
stock of employment rather than the average number of hours per worker, conﬁrming the
ﬁndings of Cooley & Prescott (1995). The wage bill per worker is signiﬁcantly less volatile
than output. Besides, we observe that consumption is somewhat less volatile than output,
while investment ﬂuctuates more. Inﬂation exhibits signiﬁcantly less cyclical variability
than output, is counter-cyclical, and very persistent.
Quite surprisingly, we notice that the unconditional moments of the French economy
are fairly similar. The most interesting diﬀerences are the following. The volatility of
French output is only about 2/3 of the US value. This implies that the absolute volatility
of aggregate variables like unemployment, vacancies, investment or consumption is sig-
niﬁcantly lower than in the US, although the relative volatilities are very close to each
16Section (3.3) sheds some light upon this surprising result. The presence of real wage rigidity is
relevant for the transmission of monetary policy. However, the medium US value and the high French
value generate almost the same results
17Shimer (2005) stimulated a considerable discussion on how to match the high volatility found in the
data. The most prominent examples include staggered Nash bargaining (Gertler & Trigari 2009) and an
alternative calibration procedure (Hagedorn & Manovskii 2008).
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other. In addition, we note that, in France, co-movement between output and all vari-
ables considered is weaker. In particular, the wage bill per worker and its components are
essentially acyclical. Nevertheless, the wage bill per worker exhibits a considerable degree
of cyclical volatility.
The model presented is not designed to match these facts. The model was rather devel-
oped to replicate the qualitative pattern of the impulse response functions. Nevertheless,
the model is capable to replicate a positive correlation between output and total labor
input at the business cycle frequencies to a neutral technology shock (Ravn & Simonelli
2008). Apart from that, the simulated data clearly point out along which lines the ﬁt
of the model is yet to be improved. Neither the neutral technology shock, nor the mon-
etary policy shock is able to explain the large cyclical volatility in the unemployment
rate. On the other hand, the model generates excess volatility in the number of hours
per worker. This implies that most of the volatility in total labor input is induced along
the intensive margin. At least for the US, this is in contrast to the data. The paper
by Christoﬀel & Kuester (2008) shows that the introduction of a per-period ﬁxed costs
in the production of labor services (representing, for instance, health insurance contribu-
tions) may help to increase the elasticity of the extensive margin. Another shortcoming
of the staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining model is that even modest Calvo type
rigidities in wage bargaining entail almost constant real wage rates over the business cycle.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a New Keynesian business cycle model akin to Christiano et al. (2005)
and Smets & Wouters (2003) with staggered right-to-manage wage bargaining (Trigari
2006). We assume that, upon matching, ﬁrm-worker pairs ﬁrst bargain over the real wage
rate which is subject to staggered wage contracts. In the second step, hiring ﬁrms may
choose the number of hours per worker unilaterally. This setting implies that the real
wage rate is allocative for the number of hours per worker. Consequently, any rigidity in
the real wage rate is transmitted via the New Keynesian Phillips Curve into persistent
movements of inﬂation. This feature of the right-to-manage wage bargaining is referred
to as the “wage channel”.
The key result of our paper is that a reasonably calibrated version of the model is able
to generate persistent responses in output, inﬂation, and total labor input to both tech-
nology and monetary policy shocks. New Keynesian models with Nash bargaining (e.g.
Walsh 2005), in contrast, are not able to generate hump-shaped responses to monetary
policy shocks once capital accumulation is introduced (Heer & Maussner 2010). Staggered
right-to-manage wage bargaining, however, increases not only the persistence of inﬂation,
but also of the real interest rate. Since we assume variable capital utilization, this leads
to a hump-shaped decline in the input of capital services. In addition to that, matching
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frictions induce a sluggish response in total labor input. Consequently, we observe that
the response of aggregate output reaches its minimum not impact, but just in the second
period after an innovation in monetary policy.
In response to a neutral technology shock, our model replicates a hump-shaped re-
sponse of output and a U-shaped response of inﬂation. Turning to the labor market,
we note that unemployment shows a negative impact response and then continues to
decrease sluggishly. Hours per worker, instead, exhibit a negative impact response, but
then rise for about 2 years before eventually falling. Hence, consistent with the ﬁndings
of Ravn & Simonelli (2008), we observe a positive correlation between output and total
labor input at the business cycle frequencies in response to a neutral technology shock.
Furthermore, we compare the model’s dynamic behavior when calibrated to the US
and to a European economy. We ﬁnd that the degree of price rigidity explains most
of the diﬀerences in response to a monetary policy shock. Diﬀerences in the degree of
wage rigidity, instead, alter the dynamics of the model economy only by little. When the
economy is hit by a neutral technology shock, both price and wage rigidities turn out
to be important. Apart from that, our results indicate that matching frictions matter
primarily for the dynamics of the labor market.
On the other hand, neither the neutral technology shock, nor the monetary policy
shock is able to explain the large cyclical volatility in the unemployment rate. This im-
plies that most of the volatility in total labor input is induced along the intensive margin.
At least for the US, this is in contrast to the data. The paper by Christoﬀel & Kuester
(2008) shows that the introduction of a per-period ﬁxed costs in the production of labor
services (representing, for instance, health insurance contributions) may help to increase
the elasticity of the extensive margin. Another shortcoming of the staggered right-to-
manage wage bargaining model is that even modest Calvo type rigidities in wage bargain-
ing entail almost constant real wage rates over the business cycle.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis along two dimensions. First, we have
only investigated the impact of two structural shocks so far. Therefore, it seems to
be a natural choice to extend our analysis to a variety of other shocks. In particular,
the literature suggests examining the impact of investment-speciﬁc technology shock,
government spending shocks, or shock to the matching technology. The second step in
our research program will be to estimate the present model along the lines described by
Smets & Wouters (2007).
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A Tables
Parameter Description Value Source
Preferences
β discount factor 0.99 Kydland & Prescott (1982)
σc relative risk aversion 1 Christiano et al. (2005)
ψc habit formation 0.65 Christiano et al. (2005)
σq money demand elasticity 6.3 Christiano et al. (2005)
ξp elasticity of substitution 6 Christiano et al. (2005)
σf hours supply elasticity 2.43 MaCurdy (1983)
Production and the Capital Market
α capital elasticity 0.36 Christiano et al. (2005)
χs investment adjustment cost 2 Christiano et al. (2005)
χb/χa utilization elasticity 1 Smets & Wouters (2007)
δ depreciation rate 0.025 Kydland & Prescott (1982)
Matching and the Labor Market
U unemployment rate 0.057 Shimer (2005)
q(θ)θ job finding rate 0.828 Shimer (2005)
ρ job destruction rate 0.05 Davis & Haltiwanger (1990)
η∗ effective bargaining power 0.5 Svejnar (1986)
repb unemployment benefits 0.36 OECD (2006)
κV vacancy posting costs 0.01 Hamermesh & Pfann (1996)
reph leisure gain from U 0.285 Costain & Reiter (2008)
µ matching elasticity of U 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
q(θ) vacancy filling rate 0.7 van Ours & Ridder (1992)
Right-to-Manage Bargaining
σh labor efficiency 0.9775 Christoffel & Kuester (2008)
h hours per worker 1 Trigari (2006)
η “nominal” bargaining power 0.5 Nash (1953)
Government and Monetary Policy
g governmental consumption 0.18 Smets & Wouters (2007)
(PY )/M velocity of money 0.36 Christiano et al. (2005)
φr autoregressive parameter 0.8 Gertler et al. (2008)
φpi Taylor principle parameter 2.0 Gertler et al. (2008)
φy output gap parameter 0.3 Gertler et al. (2008)
Price and Wage Rigidity
ωp price rigidity 0.60 Christiano et al. (2005)
ωw wage rigidity 0.65 Christiano et al. (2005)
Stochastic Processes
ρz technology shock persistence 0.95 Cooley & Prescott (1995)
ιz technology shock sd 0.007 Cooley & Prescott (1995)
ιm monetary policy shock sd 0.002 Gertler et al. (2008)
Table 1: The parameterized US model economy
Parameter Description Value Source
ωFp price rigidity 0.75 Álvarez et al. (2006)
ωFw wage rigidity 0.83 du Caju et al. (2008)
UF unemployment rate 0.091 OECD (2008b)
qF (θF )θF job finding rate 0.212 OECD (2008a)
ρF job destruction rate 0.021 OECD (2008a,b)
repF
b
unemployment benefits 0.57 OECD (2006)
repF
h
leisure gain from U 0.188 implied
σF
f
hours supply elasticity 4.19 implied
σF
h
labor efficiency 0.9723 implied
Table 2: Parameters specific to the French model economy
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Y π U N N × l l w w × l V I C
US Data
σX/σY (0.015) 0.59 7.32 0.80 0.96 0.26 0.50 0.54 9.03 2.88 0.82
ρX,Y 1.00 -0.64 -0.86 0.81 0.87 0.70 0.20 0.52 0.89 0.94 0.85
ρXt,Xt+1 0.86 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.82 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.86
US σX/σY (0.03) 0.37 0.68 0.04 1.03 0.99 0.13 1.08 0.90 2.14 0.34
Technology ρX,Y 1.00 -0.64 -0.91 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.67 0.95 0.71 0.99 0.98
Shock ρXt,Xt+1 0.94 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.95 0.93
US σX/σY (0.003) 0.29 1.50 0.09 1.24 1.18 0.03 1.18 3.06 1.74 0.41
Monetary ρX,Y 1.00 0.79 -0.89 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.54 0.99 0.99
Policy Shock ρXt,Xt+1 0.74 0.87 0.53 0.53 0.74 0.73 0.84 0.73 0.13 0.78 0.72
French Data
σX/σY (0.009) 0.98 6.19 0.58 0.72 0.56 0.84 0.65 8.18 3.01 0.90
ρX,Y 1.00 -0.49 -0.70 0.77 0.67 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.31 0.87 0.71
ρXt,Xt+1 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.83 0.77 0.77 0.90 0.73
France σX/σY (0.02) 0.33 0.38 0.04 1.23 1.20 0.07 1.24 1.06 2.04 0.36
Technology ρX,Y 1.00 -0.64 -0.99 0.99 0.92 0.92 0.72 0.93 0.67 0.99 0.95
Shock ρXt,Xt+1 0.95 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.87 0.86 0.97 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.95
France σX/σY (0.004) 0.12 0.52 0.00 1.24 1.21 0.00 1.21 2.76 1.79 0.38
Monetary ρX,Y 1.00 0.80 -0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.66 0.99 0.99
Policy Shock ρXt,Xt+1 0.79 0.91 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.79 0.43 0.83 0.76
Table 3: Simulated Second Moments. For each variable, we report the relative standard deviation with respect to output σX/σY , the co-movement with output
ρX,Y , and the first order autocorrelation ρXt,Xt+1 . The percentage standard deviation of output is given in brackets. All data (1970:1-2008:4) are taken from the
OECD databases “Economic Outlook” and “Main Economic Indicators”. The time series of French vacancies starts only in 1989:1. All time series are logged and
de-trended with a Hodrick & Prescott (1997) filter 1600.
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B Impulse Response Functions
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of the US model economy to a monetary policy shock. The black solid line
represents the case ωw = 0.00. The back dashed line represents the case ωw = 0.01. The orange solid line
represents the case ωw = 0.65. The orange dashed line represents the case ωw = 0.83. Units on the y-axis
are given as percentage deviation from the steady state. Units on the x-axis correspond to quarters.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of the US model economy to a neutral technology shock. The black solid
line represents the case ωw = 0.00. The back dashed line represents the case ωw = 0.01. The orange
solid line represents the case ωw = 0.65. The orange dashed line represents the case ωw = 0.83. Units
on the y-axis are given as percentage deviation from the steady state. Units on the x-axis correspond to
quarters.
29
Average Real Wage Hours (Average Real Wage)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-0,04
-0,03
-0,02
-0,01
0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-2
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
Re-Negotiated Wage Hours (Re-Negotiated Real Wage)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-0,07
-0,06
-0,05
-0,04
-0,03
-0,02
-0,01
0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
Eta* Hours (Lagged Real Wage)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-2,5
-2
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
Real Marginal Costs Price Level
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-0,4
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-0,4
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
Unemployment Output
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
Capital Services Total Labor Input
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
-2
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock. The red solid line represents the US model
economy. The red dashed line represents the French model economy, but prices and wages are as flexible
as in the US. The blue dashed line represents the French model economy with prices as flexible as in the
US. The blue solid line represents the French model economy. Units on the y-axis are given as percentage
deviation from the steady state. Units on the x-axis correspond to quarters.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Neutral Technology Shock. The red solid line represents the US
model economy. The red dashed line represents the French model economy, but prices and wages are as
flexible as in the US. The blue dashed line represents the French model economy with prices as flexible
as in the US. The blue solid line represents the French model economy. Units on the y-axis are given as
percentage deviation from the steady state. Units on the x-axis correspond to quarters.
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C The Log-Linear Model
Mˆt = −µ(N/U)Nˆt−1 + (1− µ)Vˆt ad (1)
qˆt = Mˆt − Vˆt ad (2)
NNˆt = (1− ρ)NNˆt−1 +MMˆt ad (3)
wˆt = ωwwˆ∗t + (1− ωw)wˆt−1 ad (4)
K ˆ¯Kt = (1− δ)K
ˆ¯Kt−1 + IIˆt ad (8)
λˆc,t = [σc/((1− ψc)(1− βψc))]
[
ψCˆt−1 −
(
1 + βψ2c
)
Cˆt + ψcβEt
{
Cˆt+1
}]
ad (12)
rrˆt = χaxˆt ad (13)
λˆc,t = Rˆt + Et
{
λˆc,t+1 − πt+1
}
ad (14)
Iˆt =
[(
λˆk,t − λˆc,t)/χs
)
+ Iˆt−1 + βEt
{
Iˆt+1
}]/(
1 + β
)
ad (16)
Qˆt = λˆk,t − λˆc,t ad (17)
Qˆt = Et
{
λˆc,t+1 − λˆc,t + β(1− δ)Qˆt+1 + βrrˆt+1
}
ad (17)
WWˆ∗t =
wh
1− σh
(
Wˆt − σhwˆ
∗
t
)
−
ψfh
1+σf
(1− σh)λc
(
Wˆt − wˆ
∗
t
)
+
ψfh
1+σf
(1 + σf )λc
λˆc,t ad (18)
+
β(1− ρ)ωw
1− β(1− ρ)ωw
(
σhwh
1− σh
−
ψfh
1+σf
λc(1− σh)
)
Et
{
wˆ∗t+1 − wˆ
∗
t
}
−
βq(θ)θωw
1− β(1− ρ)ωw
(
σhwh
1− σh
−
ψfh
1+σf
λc(1− σh)
)
Et
{
wˆ∗t+1 − wˆt
}
+ (1− ρ− q(θ)θ)βWEt
{
λˆc,t+1 − λˆc,t + Wˆ∗t+1
}
− βWq(θ)θ
(
Mˆt + (N/U)Nˆt−1
)
Yˆt = ǫˆzt + α
ˆ¯Kt−1 + αxˆt + (1− α)Nˆt−1 + (1− α)σhhˆt ad (22)
ǫˆzt = ρ
z ǫˆzt−1 + ιˆ
z
t ad (23)
rˆt = λˆy,t + Yˆt −
ˆ¯Kt−1 − xˆt ad (24)
Wˆt = λˆy,t + Yˆt − Nˆt−1 − σhhˆt ad (25)
πˆt =
(
πˆt−1 + βEt {πˆt+1}+ [((1− βωp)(1− ωp))/ωp]λˆy,t
)/(
1 + β
)
ad (27)
J Jˆ ∗t =
wh
σh
(
Wˆt − σhwˆ
∗
t
)
ad (29)
+
whβ(1− ρ)ωw
1− β(1− ρ)ωw
Et
{
wˆ∗t+1 − wˆ
∗
t
}
+ β(1− ρ)JEt
{
λˆc,t+1 − λˆc,t + Jˆ ∗t+1
}
−
κ
q
qˆt =
[
whβωw
1− β(1− ρ)ωw
]
Et
{
wˆ∗t+1 − wˆt
}
+ βJEt
{
λˆc,t+1 − λˆc,t + Jˆ ∗t+1
}
ad (31)
wˆt = Wˆt − (1− σh)hˆt ad (32)
Jˆ ∗t = Wˆ
∗
t + δˆ
F
t − δˆ
W
t ad (34)
32
δW δˆWt = −
whσh
(1− σh)2
(
Wˆt − σhwˆ
∗
t
)
+
(1 + σf )ψfh1+σf
(1− σh)2λc
(
Wˆt − wˆ
∗
t
)
−
ψfh
1+σf
(1− σh)λc
λˆc,t
ad (35)
+ β(1− ρ)ωwδWEt
{(
(1 + σf )
(1− σh)2
ψfh
σf
λw
−
(
σh
1− σh
)2)(
wˆ∗t+1 − wˆ
∗
t
)}
+ β(1− ρ)ωwδWEt
{
δˆWt+1 + λˆc,t+1 − λˆc,t
}
δF δˆFt =
wh
1− σh
(
Wˆt − σhwˆ
∗
t
)
ad (36)
+ β(1− ρ)ωwδFEt
{
σh
1− σh
(
wˆ∗t+1 − wˆ
∗
t
)
+ δˆFt+1 + λˆc,t+1 − λˆc,t
}
Rˆt = φrRˆt−1 + (1− φr)φpiπˆt + (1− φr)φyYˆt + ǫˆrt ad (40)
ǫˆrt = ρ
r ǫˆrt−1 + ιˆ
r
t ad (40)
Y Yˆt = IIˆt + CCˆt + κV Vˆt +GYˆt +Kχbxˆt ad (41)
33
